Haiti is gripped by a deepening security crisis, marked by rampant gang violence that holds the nation hostage. The streets of Port-au-Prince, once bustling with life, have become sites of unspeakable violence, with over 200 gangs reportedly controlling nearly 80% of the city. Against this backdrop of bloodshed and instability, the international community, led by Kenya, CARICOM, and the United States, is attempting to find solutions. But can this fragmented and often foreign intervention bring lasting peace to a nation battered by centuries of external interference?
To understand Haiti’s current gang crisis, it is critical to recognize the legacy of international interventions that have shaped the nation’s path. The United States, Canada, and France played key roles in Haiti’s instability, beginning with the 2004 coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The ensuing period saw the arrival of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was marked by numerous human rights abuses, including a deadly cholera outbreak introduced by UN peacekeepers. These interventions, intended to stabilize the nation, instead eroded trust in international institutions and left Haiti more fragile than before.
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Today’s gang violence is a byproduct of this long history. The power vacuum created by weak governance, combined with economic degradation, allowed criminal organizations to flourish. Gangs control entire neighborhoods, and their influence extends into the political and economic spheres, further eroding Haiti’s sovereignty.
Kenya has taken an unlikely leadership role in Haiti, with the Kenyan police force being the centerpiece of the United Nations’ Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS). Kenya’s involvement, while significant, reflects broader geopolitical dynamics. The U.S., weary of committing troops and haunted by past failures, sees Kenya’s engagement as a low-risk strategy to bring stability. However, this raises important questions. Kenyan forces, despite their capacity, are ill-equipped for the complexities of Haiti’s gangs, which are deeply embedded in local communities. Many Haitians remain skeptical, fearing that Kenya’s mission will become yet another in a long line of foreign occupations, reminiscent of the UN’s disastrous legacy under MINUSTAH.
Moreover, the scope of the MSS, with just 1,000 Kenyan police officers on the ground, is insufficient to tackle the sprawling network of criminal organizations. It is clear that Kenya’s involvement is more symbolic than transformational; the heavy lifting of rebuilding Haiti’s fractured institutions will require far more than a limited deployment of foreign police.
CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, has also stepped up in mediating Haiti’s political crisis. Earlier in 2024, CARICOM successfully brokered a political accord aimed at guiding the country toward democratic elections by 2026. This was a crucial step forward, but the challenges are immense. Haiti’s political landscape is fragmented, and the transitional government is led by Prime Minister Garry Conille.
The United States bears significant responsibility for Haiti’s current plight. The 2004 coup, engineered with Washington’s backing, set off a cascade of political instability that led to the rise of gangs. Moreover, U.S. policies such as trade liberalization in the 1990s devastated Haiti’s agricultural sector, pushing many into poverty and crime. The influx of firearms into Haiti, often smuggled from the United States, has armed the gangs, exacerbating the violence.
Yet the U.S. also holds the key to Haiti’s recovery. Washington’s financial and diplomatic resources are unmatched, and its ability to rally international support is critical. The Biden administration has shown a willingness to engage, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently visiting Haiti to assess the situation. However, U.S. policy remains inconsistent. While Washington supports the MSS, it has resisted calls for direct military intervention. The U.S. must play a more proactive role, not just in terms of security but in addressing the root causes of Haiti’s instability—poverty, corruption, and weak governance.
First, the international community must prioritize Haitian-led solutions. Haiti’s civil society is vibrant and resilient, and any attempt to solve the crisis must engage these actors in meaningful ways. The MSS, while a necessary short-term measure, cannot be the long-term answer. Strengthening the Haitian National Police (HNP) should be the focus of international efforts. This includes providing training, equipment, and intelligence support to the HNP, ensuring they can gradually take control of the situation.
Second, economic recovery is crucial. Gangs thrive in Haiti because of widespread poverty and lack of opportunity. International aid should be directed toward rebuilding the country’s infrastructure and economy. This includes reviving agriculture, investing in education, and creating jobs—especially for Haiti’s youth, who are often drawn into gangs as a means of survival.
Third, the United States must reckon with its past. This means acknowledging the role it played in destabilizing Haiti and committing to policies that respect Haitian sovereignty. Any solution that does not address the underlying political and economic factors will only perpetuate the cycle of violence.
Haiti’s gang crisis is not just a security issue; it is the culmination of decades of failed governance and foreign interference. While Kenya, CARICOM, and the United States all have roles to play, the future of Haiti must be determined by Haitians themselves. The international community must support, not dictate, this process. Haiti deserves a chance to rebuild, free from the shadow of occupation and violence.
